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SILENCED STORIES: HOW VICTIM 
IMPACT EVIDENCE IN CAPITAL TRIALS 
PREVENTS THE JURY FROM HEARING 
THE CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRED 




The victims’ son reports that his parents had been married for fifty-three years and 
enjoyed a very close relationship, spending each day together.  He states that his 
father had worked hard all his life and been retired for eight years.  He described his 
mother as a woman who was young at heart and never seemed like an old lady . . . .  
[The victims] were amazing people who attended the senior citizen center and made 
many devout friends . . . .  As described by their family members, the Bronsteins were 
loving parents and grandparents whose family was most important to them . . . .  
Because of their loss, a terrible void has been put into [their] family’s lives and every 
day is still a strain just to get through.
1
 
* * * 
Four of defendant’s siblings testified concerning their childhood.  Larry testified that 
Pearl and Art beat the children, sometimes while the children were tied up, and forced 
them to steal . . . .  Art killed Larry’s sister Helen . . . by smothering her.  In 1957, the 
children were taken by the State of Nebraska and placed in Whitehall Home for 
Children.  Larry stated that a housemother at Whitehall taught both defendant and him 
about sex, instructing them that “you got to hit them in the mouth before you do 
anything or they don’t like it.”  He testified that he and defendant were transferred to a 
state mental institution, where they were beaten and sexually abused and drugs were 
administered . . . .  Another sibling, Steven, corroborated the foregoing testimony and 
also recounted that “the first sexual experiences were the girls with Art and the boys 
with mom.”  The eldest daughter, who ran away before Art joined the family, testified 
that her father molested her, with Pearl’s knowledge, and that Pearl blamed the 




* J.D. Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law, 2012.  I would like to thank 
everyone who offered assistance and advice in the creation of this Comment.  Thanks in 
particular to James Lupo. 
1 Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 510, 514–15 (1987). 
2 People v. Foster, 242 P.3d 105, 124–25 (Cal. 2010). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Compare these two quotes.  The first comes from a victim impact 
statement at a capital sentencing trial.  The second is information presented 
on behalf of a capital defendant at another capital sentencing trial.  The 
victim impact statement matches more closely with most people’s 
experience in the world.  This Comment will argue that, for the typical 
juror, the victim impact statement is much easier to identify with, drowning 
out the story of the defendant, who is faced with the prospect of capital 
punishment.  This makes the emotional story of the victim the only story 
given meaningful consideration by the jury. 
Cognitive psychology shows that humans filter new information 
through existing schema.
3
  This Comment will define schemas and show 
how, because jurors generally have different life experiences than 
defendants, it is easier for the juror to identify with the murdered victim’s 
schema than with the defendant’s schema.  Because of this, the stories told 
in victim impact evidence are unduly prejudicial, overwhelming any 
mitigating factors in a capital sentencing trial.  Thus, the defendant does not 
have an opportunity to present evidence of his or her moral culpability as 
the Constitution requires in capital sentencing trials.
4
 
This argument will consist of five parts.  Part II will discuss the current 
state of capital punishment jurisprudence in the United States.  Part III will 
give an overview of the current state of the law on victim impact evidence, 
outlining how the Supreme Court initially proscribed such evidence but 
later reversed itself, and in doing so failed to give guidance to lower courts 
on what manner of victim impact evidence was acceptable.  Part IV will 
give an overview and explanation of what are known in cognitive 
psychology as schemas.  This will include an explanation of how schemas 
cause people to filter information in a predetermined way, potentially 
ignoring information that does not easily fit into this format. 
Part V will show how the schemas of most jurors cause them to easily 
accept the emotionally charged stories presented in victim impact 
statements, thereby silencing defendants’ stories.  Part VI will analyze the 
case of United States v. Sampson, contrasting the story of the victim told by 





3 Albert J. Moore, Trial by Schema: Cognitive Filters in the Courtroom, 37 UCLA L. 
REV. 273, 279 (1989). 
4 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991). 
5 335 F. Supp. 2d 166 (D. Mass. 2004). 
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II. THE CURRENT STATE OF CAPITAL SENTENCING LAW 
To understand the argument against victim impact statements in capital 
trials, it is first necessary to understand the background of current capital 
sentencing jurisprudence.  The death penalty’s constitutionality is largely 
understood through the seminal case of Furman v. Georgia.
6
  An overview 
of decisions regarding capital sentencing will show that, since Furman, the 
Supreme Court has focused its efforts on ending arbitrariness and 
discrimination in capital sentencing.  Capital punishment is unique from 
other forms of punishment because it is absolutely irrevocable.
7
  While law 
should always be fair, the irrevocability of capital punishment has led the 
Court to determine that it is especially imperative to be unwaveringly 
scrupulous and fair when meting out capital punishment.
8
 
A. FURMAN V. GEORGIA AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT’S 
PROHIBITIONS AGAINST CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 
Furman and other Court decisions in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
developed the constitutional doctrine that death sentences are “qualitatively 
different” from other criminal sentences.  Strict oversight of state death 




The state has much greater power than an individual defendant.  
Because of this, the Eighth Amendment attempts to level the playing field 
between the defendant and the state by affording extra protections to 
defendants to counteract the greater power of the state.
10
  The Supreme 
Court has ruled that a sentence of death must be proportionate to a 
particular offense; otherwise, it is cruel and unusual punishment.
11
  Furman 
invoked the Eighth Amendment prohibition in the context of capital 
punishment by arguing that, because death sentences were imposed by 
juries in such a small minority of death-eligible cases and without 




The Court in Furman found punishment to be cruel and unusual if it 
was too severe for the crime, was imposed arbitrarily, offended society’s 
 
6 409 U.S. 902 (1972). 
7 AUSTIN SARAT, WHEN THE STATE KILLS: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN 
CONDITION 89 (2001). 
8 DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 1–2 (1990). 
9 Id. 
10 Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 
361, 402 (1996). 
11 McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 301 (1987). 
12 BALDUS ET AL., supra note 8, at 11. 
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sense of justice, or was not more effective than a less severe penalty.
13
  This 
standard effectively invalidated the death penalty statutes of forty states, 
thereby commuting the sentences of 629 death row inmates across the 
country.
14




Since Furman suspended the death penalty without condemning it 
forever, states wishing to impose the death penalty instituted a variety of 
new procedures in an attempt to correct the deficiencies in their death 
penalty statutes.
16
  The Supreme Court had condemned these statutes as 
standardless, discretionary, and, therefore, unconstitutional.
17
  What 
followed was an overhaul of state statutes governing the death penalty, with 
most state statutes now requiring the presence of at least one aggravating 
circumstance before a death sentence could be sought.
18
  Most state laws 
identify between six and twelve factors as aggravating circumstances.
19
 
B. GREGG V. GEORGIA SANCTIONS THE STATE’S REVISIONS TO DEATH 
PENALTY SENTENCING PROCEDURES, APPROVING BIFURCATED 
TRIALS 
Following the states’ overhaul of their death penalty statutes, the next 
important death penalty case the Supreme Court heard was Gregg v. 
Georgia, which affirmed the constitutionality of the death penalty as 
punishment for murder.
20
  In addition to ruling that the death penalty itself 
was constitutional, the Court considered revised death penalty statutes from 
Florida, Georgia, and Texas, and held them constitutional, noting that the 
new Georgia statute had sufficient safeguards to prevent the risk of the 




Also important in Gregg was the Supreme Court’s approval of 
bifurcated trials.
22
  The Court recognized that the sentencer in a capital trial 
must have discretion to consider the particular character and record of the 
 
13 History of the Death Penalty: Part I, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/part-i-history-death-penalty#const (last visited Mar. 11, 




17 BALDUS ET AL., supra note 8, at 22. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976).  
21 Id. at 226–27 (1976).
 
22 Id. at 191–92 (1976). 
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offender and the circumstances of the particular offense, and that capital 
sentencing must be contextual and particularistic.
23
  States accomplished 
this in their revised death penalty statutes through bifurcated trials.
24
 
A bifurcated trial consists of a guilt phase and a sentencing phase.  In 
the guilt phase, the jury hears evidence and argument relating only to the 
defendant’s guilt.  The jury’s task in this phase is to determine whether or 
not the defendant is guilty of murder.
25
  If the jury decides that the 
defendant is guilty of murder, the trial goes into the second phase, the 
sentencing phase.  In the sentencing phase, the prosecution and defense 
present evidence relating to an appropriate sentence.
26
 
C. AN EXPLANATION OF AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS 
As an example of a death penalty statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3593 is the 
federal statute requiring a separate trial for the guilt and sentencing phases 
of a capital trial.
27
  The statute governs the sentencing phase of a capital 
trial, which calls on the jury to decide two things: whether the defendant is 
eligible for the death penalty, and, if so, whether the death penalty is 
justified.
28
  For the defendant to be eligible for the death penalty, the jury 
must find that at least one aggravating factor has been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.
29
  The sentencing trial must include the opportunity to 
present aggravating and mitigating factors.
30
  Any mitigating factor is 
considered relevant if it has any tendency to make any fact of consequence 
to the determination of the action more or less likely than it would have 
been without the evidence.
31
 
Further, 18 U.S.C. § 3592 outlines some aggravating and mitigating 
factors that are either permitted or required.
32
  Victim impact evidence is 
 
23 Id. at 206. 
24 BALDUS ET AL., supra note 8, at 23. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 




31 Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 275 (2004).  Note that this “more or less likely 
standard” is less stringent than the “beyond a reasonable doubt standard” needed for 
aggravating factors. 
32 18 U.S.C. § 3592.  Some examples of mitigating factors included in the statute are 
minor participation, no prior criminal record, or “other factors in the defendant’s 
background, record, or character or any other circumstance of the offense that mitigate 
against imposition of the death sentence.”  Id.  Examples of aggravating factors included in 
the statute are previous conviction of other serious offenses, grave risk of death to additional 
persons, substantial planning and premeditation, or a “heinous, cruel, or depraved manner of 
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generally considered a non-statutory aggravating factor.
33
  Information is 
admissible regardless of its admissibility under the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, but the evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
outweighed by the danger of creating unfair prejudice.
34
  Although current 
law does not consider victim impact statements unfairly prejudicial, this 
Comment will argue that such statements do indeed cause unfair prejudice. 
The government’s burden of proof for aggravating factors is beyond a 
reasonable doubt.
35
  The defendant’s burden of proof for mitigating factors 
is preponderance of the evidence.
36
  Separating the guilt and sentencing 
phases allows the jury to consider evidence during sentencing that was 
inadmissible for determining guilt but is relevant to the sentencing 
decision.
37
  Additionally, the Supreme Court has ruled that a jury must be 
allowed to give meaningful consideration to relevant mitigating evidence.
38
  
Any law or instruction from the bench prohibiting the jury from considering 
any particular mitigating factor is unconstitutional.
39
  A defendant’s right to 
have mitigating evidence considered is meaningless if the sentencer is not 
permitted to consider it in imposing a sentence.
40
 
Lockett v. Ohio emphasized the significance of mitigating factors.
41
  A 
plurality in Lockett held that meaningful consideration of mitigating factors 
is required regardless of the severity of the crime or whether or not the 
defendant has potential for future dangerousness.
42
  For a defendant to be 
sentenced to death, the jury must determine that the aggravating factors 
outweigh the mitigating factors enough to justify death.
43
 
The bottom line of death penalty jurisprudence is that death is different 
from other forms of punishment.
44
  The Supreme Court, in crafting its 
policies on capital punishment, has constructed a kind of “super due 
process.”45  The Court wanted to afford capital defendants an extra measure 




committing [the] offense.”  Id. 
33 See § 3593. 
34 § 3593(c). 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 BALDUS ET AL., supra note 8, at 23. 
38 Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 264 (2007). 
39 BALDUS ET AL., supra note 8, at 23. 
40 Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 185 (1988). 
41 BALDUS ET AL., supra note 8, at 25. 
42 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604–05 (1978). 
43 United States v. Sampson, 335 F. Supp. 2d 166, 176 (D. Mass. 2004). 
44 BALDUS ET AL., supra note 8, at 1–2. 
45 SARAT, supra note 7, at 37. 
46 Id. 
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In the sentencing phase of capital trials, the jury’s attention was directed exclusively 
to the task of ascertaining the precise, personal culpability of the defendant.  Did this 
particular murderer, given the full circumstances of his or her life, deserve to die at 




The allowance of victim impact statements in the sentencing phase of a 
capital trial frustrates this “super due process.”  Because death is different, 
the damage done by any frustration of due process is heightened.  The use 
of victim impact statements in capital sentencing therefore warrants special 
consideration. 
III. CURRENT LAW ON VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENTS 
Having reviewed the current state of the law on the death penalty in 
the United States, we next turn to the current state of the law on victim 
impact statements in capital trials.  The Supreme Court has decided three 
major cases on victim impact statements in capital trials: Booth v. 
Maryland,
48
 a 1987 case that proscribed victim impact evidence in capital 
cases; South Carolina v. Gathers,
49
 a 1989 case that clarified part of the 
ruling in Booth; and Payne v. Tennessee,
50
 a 1991 case that overruled Booth 
just four years after it was decided (and effectively overruled Gathers as 
well).  In addition, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Kelly v. 
California,
51
 a recent capital murder case involving victim impact evidence.  
These decisions are considered below. 
A. BOOTH V. MARYLAND—THE SUPREME COURT PROHIBITS VICTIM 
IMPACT EVIDENCE IN CAPITAL TRIALS 
Booth v. Maryland, the first major victim impact case in the Supreme 
Court, involved the brutal stabbing murder of an older couple.
52
  John 
Booth was one of two men who invaded the couple’s home to rob them.53  
Because Booth was a neighbor of the couple, he knew they would be able to 
recognize him.
54
  As a result, the two men bound and gagged the couple and 
stabbed them repeatedly in their chests with a kitchen knife.
55
  Two days 
 
47 Id. 
48 482 U.S. 496 (1987). 
49 490 U.S. 805 (1989). 
50 501 U.S. 808 (1991). 
51 171 P.3d 548 (Cal. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 564 (2008). 
52 Booth, 482 U.S. at 497–98. 
53 Id. at 497–98. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 498. 
234 DIANA MINOT [Vol. 102 
later, their bodies were discovered by their son.
56
 
At trial, Booth was found guilty on two counts of first-degree murder, 
and the prosecution sought the death penalty.
57
  The state prepared a 
presentence report of Booth’s background, education, employment history, 
and criminal record.
58
  Because it was required by Maryland statute, the 
report also included a victim impact statement, which described the effect 
of the crime on the victim and his family.
59
  The victim impact statement 
was created based on interviews with the son, daughter, son-in-law, and 
granddaughter of the murdered couple.
60
  The statement included 
descriptions of the couple’s “outstanding personal qualities,” as well as the 




Booth’s defense counsel moved to suppress the victim impact 
statement, arguing that it was “both irrelevant and unduly inflammatory, 
and therefore its use in a capital case violated the Eighth Amendment of the 
Federal Constitution.”62  The Maryland trial court denied the motion, and 
Booth received a death sentence.  The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed 
the sentence.
63
  The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
consider whether the Eighth Amendment prohibited the consideration of 
victim impact evidence by a capital sentencing jury.  The Supreme Court 
decided that such evidence was prohibited.
64
 
The Court reasoned that the information in the victim impact statement 
was irrelevant and created a “constitutionally unacceptable risk that the jury 
may impose the death penalty in an arbitrary and capricious manner.”65  
One reason capital sentencing decisions based on victim impact statements 
are arbitrary is that such statements can vary greatly from case to case based 
on the ability of the family members to articulate their grief.
66
  The Court 
noted that in sentencing, a capital jury must focus on the defendant as a 
unique human being, but that a victim impact statement instead focuses “on 
the character and reputation of the victim and the effect on [the victim’s] 
 
56 Id. at 498, 510. 
57 Id. at 498. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 499. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 500–01. 
63 Id. at 501. 
64 Id. at 501–02. 
65 Id. at 502–03. 
66 Id. at 505. 
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family.”67  These factors are unlikely to be related to the blameworthiness 
of the defendant and could shift the “jury’s attention away from the 
defendant’s background and record, and the circumstances of the crime.”68 
B. SOUTH CAROLINA V. GATHERS—THE SUPREME COURT EXTENDS 
BOOTH’S HOLDING TO PROSECUTORS’ FINAL ARGUMENTS 
Not long after its decision in Booth, the Supreme Court heard another 
case related to victim impact evidence, South Carolina v. Gathers.
69
  In 
Gathers, the Court considered whether a prosecutor’s closing argument, 
which included extensive comments on the victim’s character, was 
admissible as victim impact evidence despite the fact that the information 
did not come from a family member of the victim.
70
  The Supreme Court of 
South Carolina, in light of Booth, reversed the defendant’s death sentence in 
Gathers and remanded for a new sentencing procedure.
71
  The United States 
Supreme Court agreed, stating: 
While in this case it was the prosecutor rather than the victim’s survivors who 
characterized the victim’s personal qualities, the statement is indistinguishable in any 
relevant respect from that in Booth.  As in Booth, “[a]llowing the jury to rely on [this 
information] . . . could result in imposing the death sentence because of factors about 
which the defendant was unaware, and that were irrelevant to the decision to kill.”
72
 
In Gathers, Justice Scalia penned a vigorous dissent.
73
  He argued that 
stare decisis should not prevent an overruling of Booth v. Maryland, since it 
was an erroneous opinion.
74
  The next major Supreme Court case involving 
victim impact evidence granted Justice Scalia’s wish.  Just four years after 
Booth v. Maryland, and two years after South Carolina v. Gathers, the 
Supreme Court took the unusual step of overruling its recent precedent.
75
 
C. PAYNE V. TENNESSEE—THE SUPREME COURT REVERSES ITSELF AND 
ALLOWS VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE IN CAPITAL SENTENCING 
In Payne, the defendant, Pervis Payne, was convicted on two counts of 
first-degree murder and sentenced to death for both murders.
76
  Payne’s 
girlfriend lived in an apartment across the hall from the victims, Charisse 
 
67 Id. at 504. 
68 Id. at 505. 
69 490 U.S. 805 (1989). 
70 Id. at 810–11. 
71 Id. at 810. 
72 Id. at 811 (quoting Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 505 (1987)). 
73 Id. at 823–25 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
74 Id. 
75 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991). 
76 Id. at 811. 
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Christopher and her two-year-old daughter, Lacie.
77
  Payne went into 
Charisse’s apartment and made sexual advances towards her, becoming 
violent when she resisted.
78
  A neighbor called the police after hearing what 
she described as a “blood curdling scream.”79  When the police arrived, they 
found Charisse and her daughter dead from numerous stabbing wounds 
inflicted by a butcher knife.
80
  Despite severe wounds, Charisse’s three-
year-old son, Nicholas, survived.
81
 
At the sentencing phase of trial, victim impact evidence was presented, 
largely centering around the effect of the murder on Nicholas.
82
  Payne 
received the death sentence.
83
  The Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed 
this sentence despite the defendant’s argument that the victim impact 
evidence violated his Eighth Amendment rights under Booth and Gathers.
84
 
1. Majority Decision in Payne 
The Court in Payne gave a nod to the concern that victim impact 
evidence would result in juries finding defendants whose victims were an 
asset to the community more deserving of punishment than those whose 
victims were perceived as less worthy.
85
  The Court, however, went on to 
say that victim impact evidence was not offered for the purpose of 




The Payne majority concluded that, within constitutional limitations, 
states are free to prescribe the method by which those who commit murder 
should be punished.
87
  States remain free to develop new procedures and 
methods to punish, and, according to Payne, victim impact evidence is just 
another method.
88
  The Court concluded that the Booth decision was wrong, 
and that victim impact evidence in the majority of cases serves legitimate 
purposes. 
[A] State may properly conclude that for a jury to assess meaningfully the defendant’s 
moral culpability and blameworthiness, it should have before it at the sentencing 
 
77 Id.  
78 Id. at 812. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 812–13. 
81 Id. at 812. 
82 Id. at 814–16. 
83 Id. at 816. 
84 Id. at 816. 
85 Id. at 823. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 824. 
88 Id. at 824–25. 
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phase evidence of the specific harm caused by the defendant . . . .  By turning the 
victim into a “faceless stranger at the penalty phase of a capital trial,” Booth deprives 
the State of the full moral force of its evidence and may prevent the jury from having 




In an opinion that discounted the view that “death is different,”90 the 
Court in Payne agreed with the Supreme Court of Tennessee.  The Supreme 
Court of Tennessee rejected Payne’s arguments regarding the unfairness of 
victim impact evidence at his trial.  They reasoned that it is an affront to 
civilized humans to allow unlimited witnesses to present mitigating 
evidence for the defendant, but not to allow evidence on the character of or 
harm inflicted on the victim.
91
  The Court rejected the view that the 
defendant should get the broadest latitude under the Eighth Amendment 
while not permitting the state to argue to the jury the human cost of the 
crime the defendant committed.
92
 
2. Dissenting Opinions in Payne 
Two dissents were written in Payne.  Justice Marshall’s dissent argued 
that even if the defendant were in a position to foresee the likely impact of 
his crime, victim impact evidence still creates an unacceptable risk of 
arbitrariness in sentencing.
93
  Justice Marshall reiterated the Booth view that 
victim impact evidence has an inherent capacity to draw the jury’s attention 
away from the defendant’s character and the circumstances of the crime to 
things that should not bear on a sentencing decision, such as the eloquence 
of family members in expressing their grief or the status of the victim in the 
community.
94
  Justice Marshall reminded the Court that death is different 
from other punishments, and chastised the majority for using noncapital 




Justice Stevens noted in his dissent that, up until the majority’s 
decision in Payne, a decision to impose the death penalty had to be based 
solely on evidence informing the jury about the character of the offense and 
the defendant.
96
  He wrote, “evidence that serves no purpose other than to 
appeal to the sympathies of the jurors has never been considered 
 
89 Id. (citations omitted). 
90 See supra Part II.B.  
91 Payne, 501 U.S. at 826. 
92 Id. at 826–27. 
93 Id. at 846 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 846 n.1. 
96 Id. at 856 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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admissible.”97  Justice Stevens argued that since the victim’s character was 
not on trial, it should not be used as either an aggravating or mitigating 
circumstance.
98
  His arguments also supported the idea that death is 
different.
99
  His dissent pointed out that the Constitution grants certain 
rights to the criminal defendant and imposes special limitations on the state 
to protect the defendant from its disproportionate power.
100
  Criminal 
prosecution therefore does not require an even balance between the 
defendant and the state.
101
  Perhaps most relevant to the idea that jurors too 
easily identify with victim impact statements was Justice Stevens’s 
response to the majority’s assertion that victim impact evidence shows that 
each victim is unique.  Justice Stevens stated that “[t]he fact that each one 
of us is unique is a proposition so obvious that it surely requires no 
evidentiary support.”102 
Despite the arguments of the Payne dissenters, Payne v. Tennessee has 




D. KELLY V. CALIFORNIA—THE COURT DENIES CERTIORARI ON A 
RECENT VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE CASE 
The most recent Supreme Court consideration of victim impact 
evidence resulted in denial of certiorari in the case of Kelly v. California.
104
  
Kelly v. California involved two cases where victim impact evidence was 
presented in video format.
105
 
Kelly involved the murder of nineteen-year-old Sara Weir, whose body 
was found several days after she had been stabbed to death with a pair of 
scissors.
106
  The body was nude and wrapped in a blanket, and a plastic bag 
was taped over the head with a helmet over the bag.
107
  Kelly’s fingerprints 
were found on the tape and helmet.
108
  Kelly, who did not present any 
evidence at either the guilt or the sentencing phase, was sentenced to 
 
97 Id. at 856–57. 
98 Id. at 859. 
99 Id. at 860. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 866. 
103 Id. at 830 (majority opinion). 
104 129 S. Ct. 564, 564 (2008) (denying certiorari). 
105 The video used as a victim impact statement is available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/media/media.aspx. 
106 People v. Kelly, 171 P.3d 548, 555 (Cal. 2007). 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 




At sentencing, the victim’s mother presented a videotape of Sara’s life 
set to music that was played to the jury.
110
  Kelly appealed his death 
sentence, arguing that the videotape should not have been admitted.
111
  
However, the appellate court agreed with the trial court that the probative 




Justice Stevens disagreed with the decision to deny certiorari for Kelly 
v. California.
113
  Even if the Court did not want to proscribe victim impact 
evidence completely, Justice Stevens noted that the Payne decision’s lack 
of guidance on what was permissible as victim impact evidence has resulted 
in a lack of clear limits on the scope, quantity, or type of victim impact 
evidence capital juries are permitted to consider.
114
  The only guidance that 
Payne provided was that victim impact evidence relating to the victim’s 
personal characteristics and the emotional impact of the murder on the 
victim’s family was permissible.115 
States have admitted a wide variety of victim impact evidence, such as 
evidence regarding the victim’s good character, talents, intelligence, 
spirituality, work ethic, education, and standing in the community, to name 
just a few.
116
  Most states do not limit the number of witnesses who can 
give victim impact evidence, and have allowed a wide range of evidence to 
be presented concerning the murder’s effects on the victim’s family.117  Not 
only has the verbal testimony allowed been broad, but courts have allowed 
victim impact testimony in several other media as well.
118
  These media 
have included “poems, videotapes, pre-death photographs, and handcrafted 
items made by the victim.”119 
More guidance on victim impact evidence and more limits on the types 
of victim impact evidence that are admissible would lower the risk that the 
jury will decide a capital defendant’s sentence in an arbitrary and capricious 
 
109 Id. at 556–57. 
110 Id. at 557. 
111 Id. at 567–68. 
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manner.  The Supreme Court should have granted certiorari in the case of 
Kelly v. California to revisit the issue of victim impact evidence.  Even if 
the Court chose not to proscribe victim impact evidence entirely, it could 
have offered some much-needed guidance to the lower courts on the types 
of victim impact evidence that may be used in capital sentencing. 
IV. EXPLANATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL SCHEMAS 
The information presented in victim impact statements has the 
potential to overpower the constitutionally required mitigating information 
presented on behalf of the capital defendant.  This is in part because the 
victim’s story is generally more recognizable and relatable to the juror’s 
own experiences than is the story of the defendant.  Cognitive psychology 
recognizes that people filter information in a way that focuses on what is 
familiar through the use of schemas. 
A brief overview of some of the cognitive structures that are involved 
in decisionmaking is helpful in understanding this concept of filtering 
information.  A schema is a cognitive structure that categorizes information 
in the mind about certain subjects.
120
  This includes both general knowledge 
of the subject, as well as specific instances.
121
  For example, a supermarket 
schema might contain the general information that supermarkets are often 
part of a shopping center.  A supermarket schema may also contain the 




Schemas are used to assign meaning to information we receive.
123
  
Schemas give us a frame of reference that we can use to interpret incoming 
information by matching it with preexisting schemas.
124
  For example, if we 
receive information about a store located in a shopping center that sells food 
items, we may filter it through our supermarket schema and realize that the 
store is a supermarket.  Schemas also help us filter out irrelevant stimuli 
and focus on information that seems important.
125
 
There are three main types of social schemas: person, role, and 
event.
126
  Person schemas contain information about specific personality 
types (for example, what an introvert is).
127
  Role schemas contain 
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information about different occupations or social roles, as well as social 
groups (for example, parents, blacks, or women).
128
  Event schemas contain 
information about a variety of social events (for example, football games, 
faculty meetings, or robberies).
129
 
Schemas also contain what are known as prototypes.
130
  A prototype is 
not a specific instance, but rather can be defined as the best or most 
representative example of a schema.
131
  For example, an individual’s 
prototypical football player, or her best example of a football player, may 
be someone who is heavyset and muscular (but not an actual football player 
with whom the individual is acquainted).
132
  A prototype of an event 
schema can be referred to as a “script.”133 
V. HOW JURIES USE SCHEMAS TO PROCESS INFORMATION 
Jurors often make decisions based on likelihoods rather than on 
absolute certainties.
134
  When placed in such situations, people often use 
simplifying strategies known as heuristics to make decisions, rather than 
using mathematical or statistical methods.
135
  Jurors use a common 
heuristic, the representative heuristic, in conjunction with schematic 
information processing to make decisions.
136
  This is because jurors 
categorize statements and stories they hear through representative 
heuristics, “which hold[] that the likelihood that event A belongs to class X 
is equal to the degree to which A resembles or is similar to X.”137  When a 
juror is given information about a person, the juror uses that information to 




Juries use schema and scripts to decide which stories are believable or 
true.  They assess the quality of a party’s story against their own 
schemas.
139
  Professor Moore explains: 
At trial, jurors are typically presented with concrete stories about human intentions 
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particular mode of thought used to interpret these stories or a shorthand strategy for 
dealing with concrete problems, it seems that the jury’s determination of “what really 
happened” will often be strongly influenced by the degree to which the concrete 




Additionally, “concrete, emotionally interesting information has greater 
power [than abstract information has] to capture a juror’s attention.”141  
This is because concrete, emotional information is more likely to call up 
schemas or scripts that are well-worn into the juror’s mind.142  These 




Research shows that individuals do not call up all available schemas 
when assessing information.
144
  Jurors filter out some potential schematic 
matches and use a limited number of schemas when assessing information 
at trial.
145
  Jurors’ use of schemas at trial poses a potential problem with the 
jurors’ ability to hear and weigh all the evidence.  This problem is referred 
to as belief perseverance.
146
 
Belief perseverance essentially keeps a juror from changing his or her 
mind regarding an initial assessment of an uncertain event.
147
  When 
presented with information, individuals often use scripts and schema to fill 
in the background information to explain why something happened the way 
it did, or why something is the way it is.
148
  Once a juror has constructed an 
explanatory theory in this way, it becomes difficult for him or her to call the 
theory into question or pay attention to other potential feature matches.
149
  
Moore explains that “[p]eople generally try to minimize cognitive 
dissonance, that is, inconsistencies between their actions and their attitudes 
and beliefs . . . .  [T]hey will explain away seemingly aberrant results in a 
way that does not call into question the validity of their initial judgment.”150  
Belief perseverance makes it difficult for jurors to change the initial 
impressions they form of a case.  A juror’s assessment of information 
through schemas of what is familiar to him or her may prevent 
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consideration of other countervailing information.  A juror will look for and 
remember information that supports his or her initial impression.
151
 
In other words, much potentially useful information at trial is filtered 
out and attention is instead focused on information that fits stored schemas 
or scripts.
152
  Cognitive filters prevent jurors from considering all relevant 
evidence at trial.  Instead, they consider the evidence that is most familiar to 
them and best fits their schemas and scripts.
153
  People distort things in the 
direction of the familiar, and use scripts as templates to do so.
154
  People 
follow the path of least dissonance, and jurors are no different.  As 
discussed earlier, the beliefs they form will persist and make it difficult for 
them to see evidence contradicting those beliefs.
155
 
Schemas undermine the fairness of sentencing hearings that allow 
victim impact evidence.  Deeply ingrained cultural and social storylines 
often subconsciously influence our sense of how truth and justice should 
operate in the world.
156
  We see and judge through filters that affect how we 
hear another’s story, translate it into something consistent with our own 
experiences, and omit or distort information to “tell a smoother tale—a tale 
whose prototype waits in the mind to be triggered.”157  This can have 
significant effect on how a juror interprets information at trial. 
Cognitive psychology scientifically shows that individuals best 
understand information that matches their own experiences.
158
  Because of 
this, bridging disparate types of experiences often requires emphasizing 
what perspectives are shared in common and downplaying perspectives that 
are not shared.
159
  It is not hard to see how victim impact statements 
essentially do the opposite of this.  They emphasize a story that is generally 
easy to understand: the pain that a murder victim’s family feels.  It is not 
hard for most people to imagine on some level the emotional pain and 
horror of losing a loved one so tragically.  However, the defendant’s story is 
less likely to fit into a juror’s scripts, and is downplayed as a result.  How 
many jurors realistically understand the mitigating factors that have driven 
a capital defendant to commit a brutal murder?  Professor Bandes notes that 
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“[w]ho we are determines what we notice, what seems important, how we 
react to it, what connections we draw, and what meaning we attach to 
things . . . .  [T]he stories we hear . . . are shaped by who we are.”160  To 
rephrase this in light of schema theory, the stories we notice and how we 
react to them are shaped by the experiences we have had in life and the 
schemas that have resulted from those experiences. 
Often, the dominant narrative drowns out the alternative story.
161
  In 
order for the alternative story (for our purposes, the defendant’s story of 
what factors in his life led him to kill) to be heard, the dominant narrative 
(the victim’s story) cannot be told.162  Victim impact statements are stories 
that should not be told because they block the jury’s ability to hear the 
defendant’s story.163  If the defendant’s story is not heard, the jury has not 
truly considered the mitigating factors.  A person’s ability to empathize 
with those from different ethnic, racial, religious, or economic backgrounds 
is often hindered by ingrained, preconscious assumptions about them.
164
  




Aristotle recognized that to accurately judge a wrongdoer, you must be 
able to put yourself in his shoes to truly comprehend the obstacles he 
faces.
166
  The jury must attempt to put itself in the shoes of the capital 
defendant in order to accurately judge whether the defendant is deserving of 
the death penalty.  The schemas that the emotions behind a victim impact 
statement trigger deflect the jury from considering the moral culpability of 
the defendant. 
How does this happen?  How do schemas and victim impact evidence 
tie in with the decisions that a jury makes?  As noted earlier, schemas give 
us a frame of reference whereby we interpret incoming information.
167
  The 




Mark Turner said: “Story is a basic principle of mind.  Most of our 
experience, our knowledge, and our thinking are organized as stories.”169  
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Law deals with stories, and stories are never more important in law than 
when they are presented at a capital defendant’s sentencing hearing.  How 
well the stories are told and received in this situation can literally make the 
difference between life and death for the capital defendant.  To be 
successful at trial, lawyers must tell stories that will influence jurors to call 
up the schemas that will be beneficial to their clients. 
The stories presented as victim impact evidence are frequently 
emotional, capturing the jury’s attention more easily than the often 
unfamiliar information contained in the defendant’s story.170  Once the 
juror’s attention is captured and he or she is listening, a victim impact 
evidence story is usually easier for a juror to match to a preexisting schema.  
The persuasive value of a victim impact statement comes from its ability to 
evoke shared images—images such as goodness, Christian piety, the little 
guy, and American patriotism.
171
 
The prosecution in a capital trial attempts to vividly portray the lawless 
violence of the defendant, while “muting racial injustice, poverty and abuse 
that often shape the life of killers.”172  Remember, people are prone to use 
schemas to fill in background information about why something happened 
the way it did.  It stands to reason, then, that jurors who have trouble 
finding a schema that matches the defendant’s story may view that story as 
implausible, and fill in the background with their own schemas.  For 
example, a juror may reject a defendant’s rough background as a valid 
explanation of why the defendant committed an atrocious crime, because 
there is no matching schema and the explanation is therefore implausible.
173
 
As evidenced by a severe jury verdict in a case where the jury did not 
believe the defendant’s story, juries evaluate the stories they hear and have 
strong negative reactions to stories they deem implausible.
174
  Additionally, 
gut reactions to implausible stories can include reactions of moral 
outrage.
175
  In the absence of an explanation, the juror may fall back on a 
schema already present in his or her mind, such as, ‘there are no 
explanations for such actions,’ making someone who commits such a 
heinous crime deserving of death. 
Capital trials effectively hide and make invisible some kinds of 
violence.
176
  A binary opposition between the angelic character of the 
murder victim who did not deserve to die and the evil character of the 
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perpetrator who does not deserve to live is the dominant cultural motif for 
representing violence and victimization.  Instead of confronting complex 
social problems, we are invited to see them in stark and simple terms.
177
 
Lawyers for capital defendants attempt to make the jury hear a story 
that goes “beyond evil deeds to the desperate lives that produce those 
deeds.”178  This is a difficult task, however, because schemas developed by 
jurors influence how they react to stories they hear, so the narratives told for 
a capital defendant must connect to commonplace, culturally recognizable 
themes.
179
  The power of a victim impact statement’s more recognizable 
story may easily drown out the defendant’s story, blocking any chance the 
defendant has of actually receiving meaningful consideration of the 
mitigating circumstances in his case.
180
 
VI. ANALYSIS OF A VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE STORY 
To understand the imbalance between the story told in the victim 
impact evidence and the story told in the defendant’s mitigating factors, an 
analysis of those factors in a particular case is helpful.  As mentioned 
earlier, this Comment will conduct an analysis of both the victim impact 
evidence and the mitigating evidence presented at the sentencing hearing in 
United States v. Sampson.
181
 
A. BACKGROUND OF UNITED STATES V. SAMPSON 
In United States v. Sampson, Gary Sampson was convicted on two 




Sampson committed several brutal murders.  Sampson first killed 
Phillip McCloskey on July 24, 2001.
183
  Sampson was hitchhiking and 
McCloskey picked him up.  Sampson killed McCloskey by stabbing him 
with a knife and attempted to steal his automobile.
184
  A few days later, on 
July 27, Sampson was again hitchhiking and was picked up by a college 
student, Jonathan Rizzo.
185
  Sampson tied Rizzo to a tree, then stabbed him 
to death and stole his automobile.
186
  On July 30, Sampson committed 
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another murder by tying Robert Whitney to a chair and strangling him to 
death.
187
  Sampson then stole Whitney’s automobile.188  Finally, on July 31, 
Sampson was again hitchhiking and was picked up by William Gregory, on 
whom he pulled a knife.
189
  Gregory, however, escaped and called the 
police to report his car stolen.
190




Sampson offered to plead guilty and accept a federal sentence of life in 
prison without parole.
192
  However, his plea was rejected by the Department 
of Justice, and, on November 19, 2002, the Attorney General filed a notice 
to seek the death penalty against Sampson.
193
  Sampson pled guilty on both 




B. THE VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE IN SAMPSON 
In Sampson, the prosecution had six witnesses testify as victim impact 
witnesses: three of McCloskey’s adult children, Rizzo’s parents, and one of 
Rizzo’s younger brothers.195  The witnesses’ testimony was given in a 
question-and-answer format and comprised about two hours of prosecution 
evidence.
196
  The judge gave the jury a lengthy explanation of the reasons 
for which the jury could permissibly consider the victim impact evidence.
197
  
Even though he noted that the jury was not permitted to allow the “victim’s 
families’ testimony to overwhelm [its] ability to follow the law,”198 the 
judge also told the jury that “I expect that the testimony that you’re going to 
start hearing soon will be emotional.  In fact, [the Deputy Clerk] has some 
[Kleenex] and if we discern that anybody wants or needs it, he’ll give it to 
you.”199  Despite the acknowledgement that the testimony was likely to be 
emotional, the judge finished his instructions with the severe warning that 
“You may not base the decision on undue sympathy, passion, or 
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prejudice.”200 
C. THE DEFENDANT’S MITIGATING EVIDENCE IN SAMPSON 
In Sampson, the defense introduced mitigating evidence showing that 
Sampson was mentally ill and had been abused as a child.
201
  Sampson 
argued that his capacity to conform his conduct to the law was significantly 
impaired.
202
  The federal death penalty statute provides that if a person’s 
ability to conform his conduct to the law is significantly impaired, even 
though not impaired enough to consider him not guilty, this can still be a 




The defense in Sampson tried to prove mental illness and brain 
dysfunction.
204
  Brain dysfunction occurs when a person’s brain has 
difficulty performing certain functions such as controlling impulses.
205
  
Such impairment can be caused by things such as mental illness, alcohol 
abuse, or withdrawal from use of drugs.
206
 
Testimony for the defense at Sampson’s trial painted a picture of 
Sampson’s troubled life.  A social worker at Sampson’s trial testified that 
Sampson’s life began unraveling at age twelve with the use of drugs and 
alcohol.
207
  Sampson claimed that his father beat him and verbally abused 
him.
208
  A prison counselor testified that, while Sampson was serving time 
for theft and burglary, he frequently sought help for mental health and 
substance abuse issues.
209
  A forensic neuropsychiatrist testified that 
Sampson knew that what he was doing when he murdered was wrong, but 
that he lacked the capacity to stop himself.
210
  Despite the fact that the 
defense raised seventeen mitigating factors, the jury did not feel that the 
mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating factors, and they sentenced 
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D. ANALYSIS OF AGGRAVATING VS. MITIGATING EVIDENCE IN 
SAMPSON 
The two competing narratives in United States v. Sampson gave jurors 
a tough decision to make.  Should they listen more closely to the story the 
victims told of the incredible loss suffered in the aftermath of a horrible 
murder, or should they listen to the story the defendant told of being driven 
to commit horrendous crimes in the aftermath of a tough life?  This is a 
common choice juries must make in a capital sentencing trial. 
The jurors in the Sampson case had to decide if the defendant’s 
purported mental illness was real and was substantial enough to make him 
undeserving of the death penalty.  In the end, the jury rejected Sampson’s 
story of mental illness.
212
  Interestingly, the judge in this case disagreed 
with the jury’s finding that Sampson was not mentally ill.213  The jury said 
that the proof of mental illness was lacking, but Judge Mark Wolf openly 




What caused the jury to reject Sampson’s story?  Look at the 
competing storylines and consider the schemas they were likely to evoke.   
The storyline of the victims is one of good citizens caught in the wrong 
place at the wrong time.  McCloskey and Rizzo were kind, generous souls, 
to a fault.  They gave a ride to a fellow citizen, who appeared to need 
assistance.  Yet this kindness resulted in horrific murders, which left behind 
families devastated by the loss of a member of their close-knit clan.
215
  A 
jury, hearing this information, could recognize this storyline and accept it as 
plausible.  A good citizen who is part of a close family matches a well-
recognized, socially acceptable schema. 
The storyline of the defendant, on the other hand, is a story of a wild, 
cold-hearted individual with no self-control.  The defense tried to convince 
the jury that Sampson lacked the ability to stop himself from acting the way 
he did,
216
 but the jurors could not accept this.  One juror noted that she 
rejected the mental illness claim because there was testimony in the case 
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that Sampson could tell right from wrong.
217
  The jury had trouble trying to 
find a schema matching the information that the defense presented about 
how Sampson’s mental disturbances drove him to commit a series of brutal 
murders.  Mark Rizzo, father of murder victim Jonathan Rizzo, expressed 
his (understandable) frustration at the defense’s attempt to mitigate 
Sampson’s actions.218  Rizzo said, “I think this is going to make us more 
frustrated and angry, to have to listen to people depict him as a good guy 
who had things go wrong in his life.”219  Although the father of a murder 
victim certainly cannot be faulted for his emotions at a sentencing trial, the 
jury is not supposed to let sentiments like this sway their reasoned 
decisions.  However, Mark Rizzo’s feelings seem to have resonated with 
the jurors as well.  The jurors in Sampson’s case could not accept the 
mitigating evidence that someone could have had so many severe issues and 
problems in his life that the death penalty was too cruel a punishment.  
Instead, they accepted the story that what Sampson had done was so 
depraved, and so unforgiveable and unexplainable, that he deserved to be 
excluded permanently from the human community.
220
 
Sampson appealed his sentence and moved for a new trial, arguing that 
his lawyers at his initial sentencing trial did not give the jurors a full picture 
of his troubled life.
221
  Sampson argued that, if the jury had received more 
information about his mental illness and childhood trauma, he would not 
have been given a unanimous death sentence.
222
  On October 20, 2011, a 
federal judge threw out the death sentence against Sampson and ordered a 
new trial.
223
  The judge said that Sampson is “entitled to a new trial to 
determine whether the death penalty is justified in his case.”224 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Although victim impact evidence may be acceptable in certain types of 
sentencing, capital punishment is a special situation.  Because “death is 
different,” there must be strict controls on what information is presented to 
a jury when a defendant’s life hangs in the balance.  The decision to execute 
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a defendant is absolutely irreversible and should not be taken lightly.  The 
Supreme Court has recognized that a sentence of capital punishment must 
not be decided upon arbitrarily and that meaningful consideration must be 
given to all mitigating factors.  Yet, the Supreme Court, despite allowing 
victim impact evidence, nevertheless has recognized that there is a risk of 
passion overwhelming reason in sentencing.
225
 
Where should the line be drawn on what victim impact evidence is 
admissible in capital sentencing?  Victim impact statements tell stories that 
are so easily identifiable to jurors that they cause jurors to easily match 
them with preexisting schemas and ignore the information presented as the 
defendant’s story.226  This means that jurors do not give meaningful 
consideration to the defendant’s mitigating evidence, an outcome that is 
constitutionally unacceptable. 
Because of the danger that the story told in the victim impact evidence 
will silence the story of the defendant told by the mitigating evidence, the 
best outcome would be for the Supreme Court to return to its original ruling 
in Booth v. Maryland and prohibit victim impact evidence statements in 
capital trials altogether.  It may, however, be unrealistic to expect the Court 
to overturn Payne, which is now a nearly twenty-year-old precedent.  Short 
of overturning Payne altogether, the Court should at the very least grant 
certiorari on the next capital sentencing victim impact evidence case that it 
has the opportunity to hear.  Had the Court reviewed People v. Kelly, it 
could have set limits on how much and what types of victim impact 
evidence were permissible.  This would have at least minimized the passion 
and arbitrariness that such evidence injects into the required fair reasoning 
process of a capital sentencing verdict. 
“Death is different,” and the Constitution of the United States requires 
that no individual be deprived of his freedom, or life, without due process 
of law.
227
  Although the actions of capital defendants are morally 
reprehensible, our Constitution requires that their stories should be heard.  
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